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Defining User Risk in Social Networking 
Services 
Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to identify the risks faced by users of social networking 
services (SNSs) in the UK and to develop a typology of risk that can be used to assess regulatory 
effectiveness. 
Design: An initial investigation of the literature revealed no detailed taxonomies of risk in this area. 
Existing taxonomies were reviewed and merged with categories identified in a pilot survey and 
expanded in purposive sample survey directed at the library and information services (LIS) 
community in the UK.  
Findings: Analysis of the relationships between different risk categories yielded a grouping of risks by 
their consequences. This aligns with one of the objectives of regulation, which is to mitigate risks. 
Research implications: This research offers a tool for evaluation of different modes of regulation of 
social media. 
Practical implications: Awareness of the risks associated with use of SNSs and wider social media 
contributes to the work of LIS professionals in their roles as: educators; intermediaries; and users of 
social media. An understanding of risk also informs the work of policy makers and legislators 
responsible for regulating access to personal data. 
Originality: A risk-based view of regulation of personal data on SNSs has not been attempted in such 
a comprehensive way before.  
Keywords: social networking services; social media; regulation; risk; privacy; information privacy; 
personal data 
 
Introduction 
Background and context 
Users of Social Networking Services (SNSs) make personal information available to social network 
providers in exchange for ‘free at the point of use’ services. This personal information is voluntarily 
provided by users, and is usually covered in the Terms and Conditions of Service or is gathered by 
service providers who track online behaviour using agents such as ‘cookies’. Making personal data 
available to a wide audience exposes users to risk. Although there have been attempts to enumerate 
some of these risks, which are described below, there has not been a comprehensive review of the 
risks or any attempt to develop a model of user risk in the context of SNSs. There is a tension about 
the relative importance of individual and social factors in the study of information behaviour 
(Bawden & Robinson 2013). This is apparent in the individual response to social media and the way 
in which different interest groups regulate access to personal data. 
An Oxis survey suggested that contrary to popular perceptions, users are becoming more aware of 
privacy as a concern on the Internet, especially when it comes to using social media (Dutton & Blank 
2013). A comprehensive review of Facebook research in the social sciences recognised the need for 
researchers to analyse the risks associated with Facebook use (Wilson et al. 2012, p.216): 
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By better understanding the threats to privacy, researchers and developers can construct 
countermeasures to mitigate the risks, and users can take informed steps towards protection 
their personal information 
This paper sets out to identify the risks to individual SNS users and to develop a model of risk that 
can be applied more widely to internet use and social media as they continue to evolve. The 
research questions were: 
 What are the risks to individuals that are associated with personal data on SNSs? 
 Is there an existing typology of individual risk that adequately covers SNSs? 
 Can a model of risks to users be used to differentiate between possible regulatory 
responses? 
Regulation is one area where an up-to-date and relevant model of risk could contribute to improved 
protection of users. Risk-based regulation has emerged as a dominant approach in Europe and the 
UK in the last few decades. Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, p.83) suggest that “Regulation can be 
seen as being inherently about the control of risks…”. This is a view supported by Hutter (2006, 
p.205): "...regulation has come to be defined as controlling and also as a way of managing risks”.  
Methodology 
In order to address these questions, this research was based on a systematic review of the literature, 
and a survey of information professionals in the UK. Modelling techniques were used to develop a 
concept of risk that is relevant to internet use and, more specifically, to SNSs. The literature review 
identified general risk typologies which were analysed in terms of: their applicability to SNSs; their 
focus on risk to individuals; and their ability to distinguish between types of risk to individuals.  
A survey of library and information service (LIS) professionals in 2014 provided insight into the 
perceived importance of different risk categories (Appendix A). This sector was chosen because it is a 
well-developed professional group representing users (many LIS staff act as intermediaries), and 
who are information literate and are therefore likely to be exposed to a wide range of online 
scenarios. It is also a cohesive group with a track record of active use of social media (Cooke & Hall 
2013). The survey was directed at UK users of SNSs using a filter question at the start of the survey 
to exclude non-UK users. This was cross-checked against the location of the IP Address of the device 
accessing the survey and logged by SurveyGizmo. The survey objective was to identify the range of 
risks to which users are exposed and to gain some insight into the perceptions of risk and priorities 
for managing risk. The survey was based on purposive sampling directed at LIS professionals in the 
UK, using a variety of forums (listed in Appendix B) to generate a snowball effect (David & Sutton 
2011, p.232). Participants were encouraged to publicise the survey through their own professional 
and personal networks.  
A model of risks was developed from an analysis of the consolidated lists of risks identified in the 
survey and the literature. A typology was developed which formed the basis of a model of personal 
risk in SNSs. The event and consequence of each risk was analysed to identify the relationship 
between the risks and to develop a definitive set of outcomes which might have the potential as a 
tool to evaluate different regulatory approaches. 
Privacy and risk 
Information privacy is an important aspect of any discussion about personal data on SNSs. The 
volume of personal data available on SNSs puts it firmly in the category of ‘big data’. It has been 
suggested that when dealing with big data “the change of scale leads to a change of state” and that 
“this transformation not only makes protecting privacy much harder, but also presents an entirely 
new menace: penalties based on propensities” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013, p.151). For 
instance, where security agencies try to prevent terrorist acts by pre-empting them, individuals are 
targeted and may be arrested or have their movements restricted without being convicted of any 
crime. Another problem is ‘fetishizing’. This is a common fallacy identified elsewhere (Hansson 
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2004), where because the picture provided by big data is so compelling, it becomes the over-riding 
factor in making a decision or judgement. 
A UNESCO report identified a range of privacy issues associated with the Internet. While these are 
not expressed as risks they could lead to users being exposed to risks. The issues identified are: 
 User identification – unique identifiers, cookies and other forms of user identification 
 Adware, spyware and malware conduct covert data logging and surveillance 
 Deep packet inspection (DPI) 
 Pervasive geo-location technology: an emerging threat to Internet privacy 
 Data processing and facial recognition 
 Internet surveillance technology 
(Mendel et al. 2012, pp.39–49) 
Anderson (2013) talks about the difficulty of applying technical ‘quick fixes’ to complex social 
systems. This can lead to mismatches between users’ expectations and the behaviour of SNSs. He 
identifies a number of scenarios to illustrate this: 
 Attacker re-posted private entries which included sensitive information in a more public 
forum 
 Permissive default privacy settings 
 Changes to privacy settings by SNS provider without consent of users. This means that 
formerly private friends lists are exposed to public view 
 Apps developers harvesting personal data to third-party advertisers and data aggregators (in 
breach of terms of reference) 
 Cautious users unwilling to expose themselves to risk and thus being severely limited in 
what they can do 
He goes on to point out that the big differences in power between service providers and users, 
effectively mean that users have little choice or control over their own data once they sign up to 
SNSs. 
Nissenbaum (2010) identifies three types of privacy issue in social media:  
1. Individuals post information about themselves, which later gets them into trouble, with an 
employer, for instance  
2. Posting information about other people, often without their explicit permission can cause 
problems. Even where there are remedies, such as removing tags from photos, the photos 
may still remain on the system 
3. Harvesting and use of personal data on social networks by advertisers 
(Nissenbaum 2010) 
Defining risk 
Risk is an elusive concept based on the notion of uncertainty sometimes expressed in terms of the 
probability of an adverse event occurring. Commonly-used definitions of risk as “a situation involving 
exposure to danger” or “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen” are 
not very specific and need to be pinned down (Pearsall & Hanks 1999, p.1602). The international 
standard on risk management starts with an even more general definition “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” and goes on to say that “An effect is a deviation from the expected – positive and/or 
negative”. The Standard does eventually provide a more specific definition: “Risk is often expressed 
in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and 
the associated likelihood of occurrence” (British Standards Institution 2010). However risk is more 
widely understood to be an event with a negative outcome, in other words, a threat: “Risk refers to 
uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with 
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respect to something that humans value” (Aven & Renn 2009, p.2). From the regulatory sphere a 
working definition is: “…risk is usually defined as the probability of a particular event (or hazard) 
occurring and the consequent severity of the impact of that event” (Baldwin et al. 2012, p.82). 
For the purposes of this paper risk is defined as an uncertain event which has an adverse impact on 
an activity or outcome. Applied here, risk is an event of unknown probability of occurrence involving 
personal data on an SNS that has a negative impact on that person. For instance, an individual’s data 
might be copied for the purposes of fraud, resulting in that individual suffering financial loss. 
 
Typologies of Risk in the Literature 
A general typology of risk 
Some early commentators have attempted to identify risks associated with the use of SNSs 
(Rosenblum 2007). However going back to more general approaches to risk identification provides a 
wider picture. There can be a distinction between physical and social risks which can be integrated 
(Macgill & Siu 2005, pp.1108–1110). Tulloch (2006, pp.132–133) adopts a social approach to risk:  
Thus, it seems clear that current research is positively engaged with the construction of self-identities 
in conditions of risk that these frequently take account of the reflexive concern for dialogic 
negotiation within and between everyday 'lay voices' and professionals, and that by and large this 
work ... embeds 'wider social understanding' analysis in quite traditional understandings of the 
'otherness' of age, gender, sexual preference, class, and (dis)ability. 
Swedlow and associates’ (2009, p.237) research into risk and regulation is based on the 
“construction of a universe of nearly 3,000 risks…over a thirty-five year period”. This provides a 
comprehensive view of the types of risk that exist generally and is used as a starting point for 
identifying and categorising the risks faced by SNS users. Some of these risks would arise directly 
from misuse of data; others are related to the data held about individual history, behaviour and 
preferences. The following categories from this ‘universe’ of risks might be applicable to social media 
and specifically to SNSs: 
Crime and violence – There have been a number of court cases where revealing personal 
data of individuals on social media has exposed them to threats of violence or to harassment 
(Agate & Ledward 2013) 
Recreation – A great deal of use of social networks is for recreation rather than professional 
purposes and it could be argued that the other risks associated with social media fall into 
this category 
War, security and terrorism – With the WikiLeaks revelations starting in 2010 and the NSA 
scandal in 2013 the press has paid particular attention to the security aspects of personal 
information (Leigh & Harding 2011; BBC News 2012; Greenwald 2013). The risks to users are 
two-fold. The first is that identifying information on social networks may be used to victimise 
or persecute an individual by a state or terrorist organisation. The second is that an 
individual’s identity may be stolen for use by terrorists or by state security agencies and in 
doing so potentially expose them to harm 
Political, social and financial – Political, social and financial harm can arise from identity 
theft. For example, if sufficient biometric data is available on a users’ profile it may be 
possible to set up a false identity to gain access to credit or to purchase products with no 
intention of paying. The individual whose identity has been stolen may be pursued for 
payment and may even be liable for debts and costs incurred through the fraud 
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Social risks may include ostracism because of private information being made available 
inadvertently to a wider audience than intended. For example expression of views that are 
not compatible with a community’s mores (whether it be a religious group, a political party 
or an ethnically-based group) may lead to some kind of sanction or even expulsion from that 
group 
Human disease / health – Mental health falls under this category. Cases where vulnerable 
young people have been driven to suicide because of harassment and bullying are an 
extreme example of this (Wakefield 2014). Less extreme, but nonetheless distressing, may 
be social isolation and associated depression. Even an affront to an individual’s self-esteem 
and confidence is a potential threat to mental well-being 
Occupational – Some employers admit that they search the social media profiles of potential 
employees and take the results into account in their recruitment decisions (Rosenblum 
2007, p.46). It is also an issue for employees who use social media in their private lives to 
express their views. If an employer deems this to be detrimental to their business or 
incompatible with their views, it could result in disciplinary action or even dismissal 
Consumer products – Consumer products are associated with advertising and this is one of 
the major areas of concern of many users (Rosenblum 2007, pp.46–47). Behavioural 
advertising depends on tracking online browsing behaviour and sites visited in order to 
deduce the interests of the user and target them with advertising for products that they are 
likely to be interested in. The impact on users could be described in terms of nuisance 
caused or possible social isolation 
Related risks – A number of the general risks identified are not core to SNS use but may be 
associated with it in some way. For example, the following would also affect the political, 
social and financial risks faced by individual users:  
 Alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs 
 Medication and medical treatment 
 Toxic substances 
 Human disease / health 
In all of these cases the risk is associated with information about these activities being available on 
personal profiles via social networks. So for instance an indication of previous problems with drug 
abuse may prejudice employment prospects, and health problems revealed online may affect 
insurance premiums. 
Other risk typologies 
Other researchers looking at the Internet have provided more relevant categories of risks that might 
be associated with use of social media (McDonald 2013; Farr 2013; Solovic 2013; Mann 2009). These 
can be broken down into risk events and associated consequences. Table 1 shows these risks 
grouped into nine main headings. 
-Take in Table No. 1- 
Risks identified in European Union legislation 
On social networks the European Economic and Social Committee issued an opinion, which 
particularly highlights the risks to children and “those with poor digital literacy”(European Economic 
and Social Committee 2010). It identified the concerns about “the risks of the illegal and abusive use 
of SNS, which rides roughshod over a number of basic human rights.” It identified threats to 
individuals (particularly to children) and more generic risks that happen to users of SNSs. Risks that 
might be relevant in the workplace include: 
Cyber-bullying 
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Privacy breaches 
Reputational damage 
Assault on personal dignity 
As well as hazards associated with geo-tagging, and facial recognition technologies, spreading of 
viruses via social media was also identified.  
Risks associated with geo-location data 
Geo-location data is an increasingly important part of the delivery of SNSs. By allowing their location 
to be uploaded by mobile service providers and applications providers, users benefit from enhanced 
services such as location of nearby restaurants, identification of friends in the vicinity and local 
maps. However there are also concerns about the risks that users are exposed to when their location 
data is available. This is a problem that the European Commission is well aware of (Article 29 
Working Party 2013). 
A number of mechanisms by which geo-location data is gathered or can be reconstructed have been 
identified. These raise some concerns about the resulting loss of privacy (Andrienko & Andrienko 
2012). Andrienko and colleagues (2013) go on to enumerate the ways in which geo-location data is 
gathered: 
 Whenever a mobile device is in use it sends a signal to the service provider. However the 
provider can send a silent text message to force active communication without alerting the 
user  
 Call data records are another source of geo-location data, which came to prominence in the 
NSA revelations in 2013 and these can give time-based data on movements (Greenwald 
2013)  
 Signal strength data can be used to triangulate the position of a mobile device  
 Users often consent (not always in an informed way) to their location being identified by 
apps providers or the mobile service provider for enhanced services. This data might be 
associated with the user ID which has obvious privacy implications  
 Anonymous location data seems to provide better protection, although the authors show 
how identity and even time-based movement data can be reconstructed  
 Some non-location data such as accelerometer data, which is freely available from some 
devices, can be used to deduce the location with a reasonable degree of accuracy 
The description of these mechanisms helps to highlight how easy it is for geo-location data to be 
gathered without the knowledge or understanding of the user, and how this information is available 
to service providers, mobile operators and apps providers. 
Risks Identified in the Survey 
 
The survey of UK-based LIS professionals ranked risks to provide an indication of priorities. The score 
is a weighted calculation. In Table 2 the item with the highest score is ranked first. In each case the 
score is the sum of all weighted rank counts: 
-Take in Table No. 2- 
‘Identity theft’ and ‘Strangers being able to see sensitive personal details’ both had high scores in the 
ranking. Identity theft can itself expose users to other risks such as fraud (ranked 4) and one of the 
consequences can be financial loss. For instance, if a user’s identity is used to apply for a loan or 
credit facilities, the victim may be left with the liability to pay back the loan. 
'Strangers being able to see sensitive personal details' ranked much more highly than 'Friends, family 
and colleagues being able to see sensitive details'. There is a dual risk of strangers seeing personal 
details – firstly as a means to commit fraud, and secondly because it exposes users to discrimination 
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by potential or actual employers, for instance. Additional comments from users were concerns 
about reputational damage and loss of face. Personal information may be exposed by the actions of 
others, such as when friends mention an individual or tag photographs or other entries with their 
names (Thomas et al. 2010). 
Some of the risks may have consequences that are more to do with social awkwardness or 
annoyance rather than loss of money or physical threat. For instance, targeting by advertisers may 
be irritating rather than life-threatening. Potentially there is the loss of face if another person makes 
assumptions about an individual on the basis of advertising that appears on a screen. There is also 
the inconvenience of screen clutter and slowing down of browsers if there is a lot of graphics or 
moving images to download.  
A consolidated model of risk 
Developing a typology of risk 
Consolidation of these risk categories yields a typology of risk related to use of SNSs. However not all 
these risks are related to access to personal data, but relate to intellectual property, security and 
organisational issues.  
Three approaches to devising a typology of risk for this domain were considered. Risks can be 
categorised by: 
Risk event 
Stakeholder affected 
Consequence 
Risk event 
A risk consists of an event, for which there is a degree of uncertainty about whether it will occur 
AND the consequence or outcome should it occur. The first part of this definition is the ‘risk event’. 
Risks can be categorized according to a universal set of risks such as those identified by researchers 
at Duke University and Northern Illinois University (Swedlow et al. 2009). These are based on risk 
events or threats. This categorisation does not take into account severity, or impact, or which 
stakeholders are affected.  
Some threats or risks could fall under more than one heading. For instance, identity theft could be 
under ‘Crime and Violence’, if it leads to fraud and eventual financial loss to the individual whose 
data was ‘stolen’. It could also be under ‘War Security and Terrorism’, where identity theft (the same 
event) results in a different outcome – a terrorist using an alias to escape detection, for instance. It 
could be argued that this might expose an individual to even greater harm such as the loss of liberty 
or even loss of life.  
Stakeholder affected 
Risks can be analysed in terms of the stakeholders. In a pilot investigation prior to the survey the SNS 
stakeholders were identified as: users, service providers, advertisers, employers, and government. 
However because this study is considering the risks associated with allowing access to personal data 
on SNSs, it is not surprising that the majority of risks will primarily affect users. Indeed a preliminary 
analysis of the risks identified to date (Table 1) bears this out. Apart from work-related risks which 
primarily affect employers, the remaining risks all have some direct impact on users. 
Although main risks are faced by users, release of personal data can have a negative impact on 
employers by damaging reputations or exposing them to legal action or prosecution. There might be 
wider risks to government or society if personal data is misappropriated and used for terrorist 
activities or economic sabotage, for instance. Many of the risks to employers of using SNSs in the 
workplace are not related to access to personal data. They include issues such as: time wasting, 
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security breaches, copyright, and libel where staff members post inappropriate materials on an SNS 
site during work hours or on a site with a strong presence by or association with the employer. 
The other side of the argument is determining who benefits from access to personal data. 
Advertisers, and those that pay them or whom they pay, benefit directly from accessing personal 
data, consolidated or not. Indirectly government benefits because of increased tax revenue from the 
resulting economic activity. Potentially users also benefit – because of more tailored experience of 
services and targeted advertising – presumably some value is perceived otherwise no-one would 
follow the links and there would be no point in advertisers using this as a method of gaining new 
custom. 
Consequence 
The risks identified when the EU’s Data Protection Directive was being developed can be divided into 
two categories: tangible risks; and intangible risks (Lynskey 2012): 
Tangible risks 
 Discrimination 
 Identity theft 
 Abuse of power by the state 
 Physical harm 
Intangible risks 
 The chilling effect 
 The feeling of helplessness 
 The apprehension of future harm 
This grouping moves towards the idea of categorising risks by their consequences rather than by the 
nature of the risk event. This can be further refined by concentrating on consequences to users 
specifically (see Table 3). This provides a means of quantifying the risks, banding them in risk severity 
categories, or at least a relative ranking. 
-Take in Table No. 3- 
Although this is a useful model, one event could lead to several different consequences. For instance 
loss of personal data (an event) could lead to harassment (consequence) or fraud (consequence). 
One consequence could also have several different causes. For example, financial loss could be as a 
result of following up inappropriate advertising, or it could be because of identity theft, or because 
of discrimination by prospective employers who have gained access to personal profiles. 
A further complication is that a consequence such as cyber-bullying arising from exposure of 
sensitive data to an inappropriately wide group, could itself lead to further consequences such as 
self-harm, loss of self-esteem and social isolation. 
From the early days of SNSs researchers have identified different standards of behaviour on the 
internet as a potential source of risk: “This artificial sense of the anonymity of Net communications 
leads people to actually lower their inhibitions, and to feel protected from the consequences of their 
speech” (Rosenblum 2007, p.45). 
Discussion 
A risk model for SNSs 
Any categorisation is to some extent arbitrary and so it is necessary to identify what criteria are used 
to select an appropriate approach. Very few commentators in this area have explicitly selected one 
or other of the three approaches discussed in this paper – analysis by: risk event; stakeholder; or 
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consequence. For the purposes of this study the key consideration is whether this allows 
differentiation of risks in terms of possible regulatory responses. 
Swedlow and colleagues (2009) analysed by risk event using categories that are too general for this 
study. The majority of relevant risks that they have identified, fall into a single category – Political, 
social and financial risks. The categories defined do not deal very well with the consequences of risk 
events such as: harassment; nuisance; loss of dignity; or invasion of privacy.  
The stakeholder approach is used by other researchers focusing on risks specifically associated with 
SNS use from an employer’s perspective (Langheinrich & Karjoth 2010). They go beyond the scope of 
this study by including risks associated with company information as well as general exposure on 
social networks. However they identify many relevant risks and this coupled with other analyses that 
focus on the user perspective, results in a list of risks based on stakeholder groups. This offers a 
method for investigating the effects of regulation (Ellison & Boyd 2013). The same event (e.g. 
sharing personal data with advertisers) may have quite different effects on each group. For instance, 
making personal data available to the partners of an SNS provider may be good for advertisers and 
some consumers, and bad for other users (especially those not looking to purchase).  
There are two main problems with the stakeholder approach. The first is that the majority of risks 
associated with inappropriate access to personal data will directly affect the user. As this study is 
concerned with risks to individuals, this is not a good way of distinguishing between risks. The other 
problem is that the list is long and un-differentiated within these two main categories, with overlap 
and potential gaps in coverage. 
The third approach analyses risk in terms of its consequences and this provides a smaller number of 
main headings under which risks can be grouped (see Table 3). This approach also allows addition of 
a stakeholder aspect so that analysis by this criterion is also possible. 
The survey brought in wider perspectives on what the risks to individuals were and how those risks 
interacted. Analysis of the risks identified and the relationships between those risks provides a clear 
distinction between risk events and their consequences. A map of the relationships between risks 
categories was developed (Figure 1) from the typology based on consequences of risks events (Table 
3). This allows the development of a model of risk relationships. The model emphasises the difficulty 
of defining limits around the definitions of each risk category, a pre-requisite for measuring or 
quantifying risk. 
The analysis of consequences produces a more complex picture than a simple listing (Table 3) can 
reveal. One of the challenges of trying to analyse risk is that some consequences may themselves 
expose individual to new risks and therefore to other types of harm. The figure uses red arrows to 
point to the risk consequences and labelled black arrows to look at the relationship between 
underlying risks. 
-Take in Figure No. 1- 
This grouping of risks has allowed an inductive derivation of five categories of consequences to 
users. Within each category, the contributing risks events are described.  
Nuisance includes being bombarded with advertisements or users being inconvenienced by having 
to go through extra steps to preserve their privacy. This could also include intrusion into private lives 
by strangers, where no other direct harm is felt. 
Psychological harm can result from exposure of private information and also from harassment and 
cyberbullying. This can range from mild social embarrassment when personal information is 
circulated to those that the data subject would not be comfortable with, through to victimisation 
and threats. It can also result from a feeling of helplessness engendered by loss of control over who 
has access to personal data. 
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Financial and material loss can arise from criminal targeting through or from fraud as a result of ID 
theft. Active discrimination in the job market – for instance by religion, race, trade union activity or 
sexuality, all of which may be inadvertently revealed on SNS profiles. Theft of intellectual property 
via SNSs – especially where users are encouraged to post pictures, videos etc. could result in loss of 
revenue (Rosenblum 2007, p.46). There have also been cases reported in the press of people 
inadvertently advertising when they are away, making them targets for burglary or home invasions 
(Roberts 2010; BBC News 2013). 
Loss of liberty is a dramatic consequence of personal data being made available on SNSs. This could 
be either as a result of exposure of criminal activity or being mistakenly identified as a criminal or 
terrorist (Strauß & Nentwich 2013). Boasts about drug-taking on SNSs or evidence of location could 
be used as evidence of criminal activity. Profiling by security services and police are approximate 
tools that have led to targeting of innocent people with consequent loss of liberty, political 
persecution and financial loss.  
Physical harm can be a consequence of criminal targeting – for instance during a robbery or a 
kidnapping. Personal data can reveal information about movements, routines and intent and 
therefore make it easier for criminals to target the individual. There are also concerns about 
personal information revealing the location of shelters for those escaping domestic abuse. 
Conclusion 
This research has identified risks that individual users of SNSs face as a result of revealing personal 
data on their profiles or through their online behaviour. Previous attempts to categorise risk have 
been too general to adequately describe the risk exposure of SNS users. Where there has been a 
focus on the risks associated with use of the internet or social media, they have tended to focus on a 
few specific aspects that were topical at the time. A consolidated list of risks reflected the 
perceptions of risk among a group of library and information professionals surveyed in the UK. 
A list of risks does not, however, describe the relationship between different risk categories. This is 
important because of the strong interdependence between them.  
A risk model that more accurately represents the potential threats to users and the consequences 
can be used as a tool for investigating different modalities of regulation. As much of current 
regulatory activity is risk-based, this approach could provide a means of evaluating different 
regulatory approaches. For example, it might be possible to consider whether proposed changes in 
legislation tend to increase or reduce each of the risk categories in terms of probability of 
occurrence and severity of impact. 
This up-to-date perspective on user risk is of potential utility to policy makers and decision makers. 
Legislators need a more nuanced tool than currently exists for evaluating proposed new laws or 
regulations. Service providers can consider the effect of different privacy settings and proposed new 
services on users, and systems designers have a tool that they can adopt to demonstrate that they 
are following ‘privacy-by-design’ principles. 
The risk model also provides a conceptual framework for trainers, educators and information 
intermediaries. These are all roles that are increasingly forming a part of the role of library and 
information service (LIS) professionals. Their role in modifying user behaviour by example and by 
user education could have a significant effect in helping users to derive the greatest benefit safely 
from SNSs and from social media generally. 
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Table 1 – Personal risks associated with SNSs 
Risk title  Description 
EXTERNAL THREATS  
Identity theft Includes tax-related identity theft. This risk may lead to other 
consequences such as wrongful arrest or financial loss 
Phishing Fraudulent link or site entices personal information form the user 
Malware link Link to malware (may be embedded in a direct message or 
attachment) which may result in external monitoring of passwords, or 
disruption to computer operations 
Hijacking of profile Hijacking of personal site, profile or page could cause embarrassment 
or inconvenience.  Could be a form of bullying as well. 
TARGETTING BY OFFICIAL BODIES 
Loss of liberty Arrest and prosecution for a crime that the user did not commit 
(identity theft) 
Prosecution and 
recrimination 
Prosecution or recrimination for posting offensive comments on 
social media.  Offender’s personal data becomes available to the 
authorities 
PHYSICAL HARM  
Kidnapping and extortion Personal information revealing whereabouts, regular travel routes, or 
activities that leave users open to extortion 
Domestic violence Abusive individuals pursuing former partners 
STALKING, HARASSMENT AND CYBERBULLYING 
Cyber-bullying and trolling  Offensive comments made by colleagues – cyber-bullying and 
victimisation, ostracism, denigration, flaming, trolling 
Inappropriate comments 
by colleagues  
Sexual harassment, sexual solicitation 
Harassment Unwanted attention from other users, cyber-stalking, offensive 
comments, hate campaigns, silent calls, threats from another user 
TARGETTING BY CRIMINALS 
Picture of home and 
possessions shared  
Making the user a target for burglars 
Home address published  Making the user a target for home invasion 
Financial loss Liability for bills incurred by fraudster (identity theft) 
Scams Often a form of phishing, where the user is required to provide 
additional personal information (such as bank account details) or 
where the user is encouraged to send money to the fraudster. This 
category includes the following scams: dating, work at home, 
investment, utility, money transfer, weight loss, fake cheques, 
mystery shopper, debt relief, pay-in-advance credit, lotteries and 
sweepstakes, miracle cures, imposter, penny auctions, technical 
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support 
DISCRIMINATION  
Sharing genetic 
information 
Denial of health or life insurance, Discrimination during recruitment 
Loss of opportunities Refusal of a job or a place at university because of material on a 
personal profile page 
Loss of financial facilities Refusal of credit or benefits because of information revealed on 
personal profile. Bad credit rating 
WORK RELATED RISKS  
Contravening company 
policy  
Leading to disciplinary action or dismissal 
PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM  
Financial records shared  Causing embarrassment with work colleagues and friends 
Sharing of genetic 
information  
Invasion of privacy of blood relatives 
Release of account details 
to relatives or executors  
Loss of dignity in death. Distress caused to relatives when details not 
revealed 
Loss of privacy Disclosure of private information 
High school pictures 
shared  
Causing embarrassment, doxing, outing 
ADVERTISING  
Persistent advertising Continual, persistent advertising causing nuisance 
Spam Unwanted marketing, junk mail, sales calls, text messages, invitations 
to connect that contain spam pointed on someone’s network update, 
discussion group spam 
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Table 2 – Ranking of risks from a survey of LIS professionals 
Item Score Overall Rank 
Identity theft 1934 1 
Strangers able to see sensitive personal details 1841 2 
Targeting by advertisers 1575 3 
Victim of fraud 1531 4 
Discrimination by employer or potential employer 1443 5 
Targeting by criminals (e.g. so that they can burgle your home 
while you are away) 
1411 6 
Friends, family or colleagues able to see sensitive personal details 1297 7 
Cyber-bullying or harassment (including stalking) 1288 8 
Targeting by official bodies or security agencies 980 9 
Extortion or blackmail 628 10 
Prosecution by authorities because of crime allegations 590 11 
Physical violence or kidnapping 451 12 
Total Respondents: 213 
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Table 3 – Analysis of risks by their consequences to users 
Consequence Risk events or threats that leads to the consequence 
Self-harm Cyber bullying 
Exposure of sensitive personal data to wider view 
Inappropriate advertising to susceptible individuals or groups 
Loss of self-esteem Cyber bullying 
Exposure of sensitive personal data to wider view 
Social isolation Cyber bullying 
Exposure of sensitive personal data to wider view 
Financial loss (e.g. job or insurance 
costs) 
ID theft leading to fraud and financial loss 
Discrimination in employment or during recruitment because 
of content of SNS profile (e.g. activities, views or past history 
– membership of a particular group, or health) 
Higher insurance premiums because of perception of greater 
risk based on SNS profile (Health, exposure to hazards, risky 
behaviour) 
Use of personal data to target for crime – e.g. burglary during 
holidays or robbery based on recent purchases 
Cost of inappropriate purchases made under advertising 
pressure 
Loss of liberty – e.g. injustices 
because of mistaken identity 
ID theft leading to mistaken identification as a terrorist 
Inappropriate use of personal data by security services to 
profile and target potential terrorists 
Violence against the person Targeting individuals for stalking 
Using personal data to get at a target for revenge, robbery, 
stalking (Rosenblum 2007, p.47) 
Nuisance Appropriation of personal data (aggregated or identifiable) 
by advertisers 
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Figure 1 – Relationships between risk events and their consequences
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Appendix A – Survey of LIS Professionals’ Attitudes to SNSs in the UK 
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1) Do you have an active profile on an online social networking service such as: Facebook, 
Twitter or LinkedIn? 
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2) If you do use online social networking services, how often do you access them? 
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Risks 
An earlier survey identified a number of risks associated with use of online social networks. 
This has been followed up by an extensive literature survey. In this section we have identified 
the main risks reported so far. We would like your views on what you consider to be the most 
important risks. 
 
For the purposes of this survey risk is defined as: "a event of unknown probability that has an 
adverse effect or consequence". 

3) Thinking about your own use of online social networks, how concerned are you 
personally about the following risks? 
 

!
!

(

	
%#


%#


			

$


)*+,
-	
.
::::::::#'#



Page 21 of 26 Aslib Proceedings
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
::::::::;

:::::::: 
::::::::	
#
#

::::::::	
#

::::::::	
#


#



::::::::%
#!!
!
::::::::-(


#!


::::::::3

#!


::::::::$

!!
::::::::1<#


::::::::$#
#




4) Are there any other risks associated with your personal data on online social networks 
that have not been included in the above list? 
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Measures to manage risk 

5) Who you think should have primary responsibility for protecting your personal data on 
online social networks? 
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6) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? These 
statements all refer to data about you, which is held by social networking services (SNSs) 
such as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn. We are interested in your views about who should be 
responsible for protecting your personal data. 
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7) Are there any further measures that you think should be in place to protect personal 
data gathered by online social networks? 
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Background information 
Finally, to help us put the results of this survey into context, could you please answer the 
following quick questions: 

8) Which age range do you fall into? 
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?
Page 23 of 26 Aslib Proceedings
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
?'.0
.'@0
@'00
0'0
'A0
A8

9) Gender 
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10) Are you a member of the LIS profession (this includes: librarians, information scientists, 
knowledge managers, records managers, information managers, and archivists)? 
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Consent form 
In order to complete this survey we need your informed consent to store and process the 
data provided in your response. If you agree to your response being used, please answer 
'Yes' to the question below. If you choose not to proceed, your response will be discarded. 

I agree that my response to this survey can be used for academic research and retained for 
future academic study. My response will be aggregated so that my identity is not revealed 
in any publication of results.* 
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*
4

 
Consent check 
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Would you like to return to the survey consent form? If you click on 'No' this will confirm 
that you do not wish to participate in the survey and your response will be discarded.* 
*
4
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Future contact 
If you are interested in the results of this survey or in participating in a follow-up study, 
please select the box(es) below: 
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My e-mail address is: 
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Thank You! 
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Appendix B – Survey Notices to LIS Professionals in the UK 
 
Discussion lists on JISCM@il 
 LIS-LINK 
 RECORDSMANAGEMENT-UK 
 LIS-PROFESSION 
 LIS-LIRG 
LinkedIn Groups 
 LIS Research Methods 
 Information Research 
 CILIP on LinkedIn 
 Information and Records Management Society Group 
 ISKOUK 
 London Information and Knowledge Exchange 
Twitter 
 Personal Twitter feed 
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